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ADDRESSING RACIAL PROFILING IN THE STATES: A CASE
STUDY OF THE "NEW FEDERALISM" IN CONSTITUTIONAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
David A. Harris*
INTRODUCMION
Some have described the Warren Court's far-reaching criminal
procedure cases as a "revolution." These decisions included every-
thing from the application of the exclusionary rule to the states,' to
the insistence on a right to counsel any time a state court imprisoned
a defendant,2 to the requirement that police give suspects the warn-
ings contained in Miranda v. Arizona.' Little wonder, then, that when
the Court shifted toward a more conservative view of criminal defen-
dants' rights, it is not surprising that at least one commentator criti-
cized this change as a "revolution to the right." ' This characterization
is almost certainly somewhat overblown. While Justices Brennan and
Marshall certainly viewed the Burger and Rehnquist Courts as leading
nothing less than a full-scale retreat from the Warren Court's path,'
the new conservative majority sometimes limited Warren Court doc-
trine but seldom overturned its best-known cases." While we can de-
bate the magnitude of this conservative shift, the direction was un-
questionably away from the protection of criminal defendants' rights
and toward a more expansive view of police and prosecutorial power.
. Balk Professor of Law and Values, University of Toledo College of Law, and SorosJustice
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I See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment to tie states via
the Fourteenth Amendment).
See Gideon v. Wainuight, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (ruling that tie right to counsel applies to
the States); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that a prisoner may not be de-
tained unless represented by counsel).
3 384 U.S. 436 (1966). To be precise, the Court said that the defendant had to receive the
prescribed warnings, or "other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused
persons of their right[s].... I& at 467.
See generally JOHN F. DECKER, REVOLLTION TO THE RIGIrT Cs.MNr.m PROCEDURE
JURISPRUDENCE DURING THE BURGER-REHNQUIST COURT ERA (1992).
5 See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 679 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ('In a chi-
merical quest for public safety, the majority has abandoned the rule that brotught 18 years of
doctrinal tranquility to the field of custodial interrogation.); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 L.S.
291, 305 (1980) (Mfarshall, J., dissenting) ("I am utterly at a loss, however, to understand how
this objective standard as applied to the facts before us can rationally lead to tie conclusion
that there was no interrogation.").
6 Cases interpreting Miranda are a good example. In die first years after te Miranda deci-
sion the Court interpreted it narrowly. See, eg., Harris v. New York. 401 U.S. 22 (1971) (ap-
proving impeachment with statements taken with defective warnings); Oregon v. Hass, 420 US.
714 (1975) (holding that the State may use statements taken after defendant asserted Miranda
rights for the purpose of impeachment). However, in the 1980s tie Court's reading of Mrranda
was more generous. See, eg., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. -91 (1980) (defining 'interroga-
tion" broadly); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (holding that police cannot question a
suspect about other offenses after an assertion of right to counsel); Minnick v. Mississippi. 498
U.S. 146 (1990) (ruling that once a defendant invokes right to counsel, no further questioning
may take place until counsel is present).
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All of this brought about a reaction that few could have antici-
pated. An effort began-"movement" may be too strong a word-to
keep alive the Warren Court's legacy of expanded constitutional pro-
tections for the criminally accused by utilizing state constitutional
provisions. This "new federalism,"7 as it came to be known, seemed
surprising. Prior to the 1960's, state constitutional law often served to
regulate criminal procedure, but only on the most obvious level dic-
tated by the actual commands in the constitutions themselves." Con-
stitutional interpretation by state courts provided little additional
content. Once the Warren Court began to increase federal constitu-
tional regulation of state criminal procedure through the use of the
selective incorporation doctrine, state courts turned their attention to
interpreting and applying U.S. Supreme Court rulings, and did very
little with their state constitutions. Indeed, the governing assumption
seemed to be that state constitutional provisions went only as far (or
less far) than the similar provisions of the newly incorporated federal
Bill of Rights.9 Thus, turning to state constitutions for the protections
of criminal defendants represented not a return to the past, but the
discovery of a heretofore almost unused source of law. Nevertheless,
proponents of the new federalism, chief among them Justice Bren-
nan, took the position that the states could and should use their
own constitutions to impose greater limitations on police practices
than the Burger and Rehnquist Courts seemed inclined to do. In his
article, Brennan argued that:
The decisions of the [U.S. Supreme] Court are not, and should not be,
dispositive of questions regarding rights guaranteed by counterpart pro-
visions of state law.... [A]lthough in the past it might have been safe for
counsel to raise only federal constitutional issues in state courts, plainly it
would be most unwise these days not also to raise the state constitutional
questions."
7 The phrase "new federalism" comes from Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Cour 62 KY. L.J. 421 (1974) [hereinafter
Wilkes, New Federalism].
8 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.4 (1999).
9Id.
10 WilliamJ. Brennan,Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions]; William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of
Rights and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 535 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, The Revival]. Justice Brennan may have been the best
known proponent of these views, but many others have also taken part in the debate. Ronald K.
L. Collins, Foreword: The Once "New Judicial Federalism" & Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REV. 5 (1989);
Justice Hans Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States'Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379
(1980); Wilkes, New Federalism, supra note 7; Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., More on the New Federalism in
Criminal Procedure, 63 KY. LJ. 873 (1974-75) [hereinafter Wilkes, More New Federalism]; George E.
Dix, Judicial Independence in Defining Criminal Defendants' Texas Constitutional Rights, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 1369 (1990); Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 1081 (1985). See generally BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1995);
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1999)." Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 10, at 502.
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In order that our system retain a "healthy federalism," Justice
Brennan urged state courts to respond to the Burger Court's weaken-
ing of federal protection for individual liberties by using their state
constitutions to do more to protect those freedoms.'2 Others-not
only academics, but also the criminal defense bar-joined Justice
Brennan's call for state constitutional action to protect the rights of
criminal defendants and gradually a number of state courts began to
act 1 3 Between 1970 and 1989, state courts published more than 450
opinions that interpreted state constitutional provisions as exceeding
what federal constitutional guarantees required." More than a third
of these cases concerned fundamental aspects of the criminal justice
15
process.
New federalism has had its share of critics. They have decried it as
inappropriate and unseemly, as a destructive force in the important
desire for uniformity in our law, and as nothing but a result-oriented
liberal tool dressed up as doctrine. 6 The Supreme Court has played
a part in this debate by limiting the new federalism, declaring that
such state court decisions will stand only when they are clearly and
unambiguously based on adequate and independent state grounds.'
7
Others, while perhaps sympathetic to justice Brennan's call to protect
the Warren Court legacy, have attempted to describe the new federal-
ism in more defensible terms and to set clear and unambiguous stan-
dards for its use."'
12 Id. at503.
is LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 8, § 2.5, at 94-95. Donald E. Wilkes described
these cases as born of"a stubborn independence that displays a determination to keep alive the
Warren Court's philosophical commitment to protection of the criminal suspecL Mare Neut
Federalism, supra note 10, at 873.
14 See Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court; and Demacratzr
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L RM. 19, 27 (1989) ('Recent devel-
opments in state courtjurisprudence bring the proper scope of state judicial review into public
debate with a frequency approaching that of the United States.").
15 See, e-g., State v. Glass, 583 P.2d 872 (Alaska 1978) (rejecting United States v. Ithite, 401 U.S.
745 (1971), and holding that "participant monitoring" must satisf state constitutional require-
ments); People v. Houston, 724 P.2d 1166 (Cal. 1986) (rejecting the ruling in Mran v. Burbine,
475 U.S. 412 (1986), stating that the failure to inform a defendant that his lavyer is trying to
reach him does not vitiate Miranda waiver); People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272 (Cal. 1976) (reject-
ing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), and Oregon v. Has, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), because
the state constitution prohibits use of statements obtained in violation of Miranda for im-
peachment); Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Miass. 1985) (rejecting 'totality of the
circumstances" test in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), because the state constitution "pro-
vides more substantive protection [than] does the Fourth Amendment in the determination of
probable cause."); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (NJ. 1987) (rejecting United States v. Leon.
468 U.S. 897 (1984), and holding that good faith rule does not comport with state constitu-
tion); State v. Opperman, 247 N.V.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (holding that automobile inventory
search upheld in South Dakota v. Oppemnan 428 U.S. 364 (1976). violated state constitution).
16 See, eg., LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 8, § 2.10. at 96-97.
17 See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S 1032, 1033 (1983) ("If the state court decision indicates
clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and inde-
pendent state grounds, this Court will not undertake to review the decision.").
18 See Hans A. Linde, E. Pluribus-Constitutional Thoq and State Comnis. 18 G.'. L REV. 165.
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I do not wish to revisit this debate here. Rather, I want to take its
result as a given: the new federalism exists, and state courts some-
times decide cases in accordance with it. The question I want to ask,
more than twenty years after it became a topic of debate, is how well,
or even whether, the new federalism has served to protect not just
Warren Court decisions but the important themes or purposes un-
derlying those cases. I wish to do this by examining one of those
purposes-the elimination of the racial bias in police practices.
Surely, eliminating racial bias in police practices was one of the
Warren Court's consistent themes. Numerous Supreme Court deci-
sions reflect this idea, and they were themselves reflective of the
greater forces and governmental initiatives of this period-the Civil
Rights Movement, federal voting rights and public accommodations
legislation, and organized protests against social injustices and the
Vietnam War. Thirty years later, the Supreme Court has clearly and
unambiguously pulled back from the goal of addressing problems of
criminal justice and race.' 9
I propose that we use this aspect of the Warren Court's criminal
procedure jurisprudence as a case study in the new federalism. When
the Supreme Court abandons a basic part of the Warren Court leg-
acy-the protection of minorities from discrimination and bias in the
criminal justice process-what response do we see at the state level?
The example of retreat from the goal of eliminating racial bias in law
enforcement that will be used here is Whren v. United States,0 in which
the Justices examined the role of pretext traffic stops in law enforce-
ment. At first blush, Whren would seem to have little to do with issues
of race, and in fact the Court decided it in just this way. But on closer
examination, we see that the issue of racial discrimination in the way
police enforce the law ran through the whole case, and was brought
directly to the Court's attention. The Justices' cavalier dismissal of
the issue gives us an opportunity to examine how states have reacted,
for good and for ill. When we look at state cases on pretext stops de-
cided since VWren, we see signs both hopeful and discouraging from
the point of view of racial justice. And that, above all, is what we
should learn from this case study: The results of the new federalism
seem a decidedly mixed bag. On the other hand, efforts other than
litigation, such as state legislative proposals, have shown that state in-
stitutions other than courts can also serve as effective guarantors of
civil liberties in ways perhaps not considered by the new federalism's
proponents.
179 (1983) ("The right question is not whether a state's guarantee is the same as or broader
than its federal counterpart as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The right question is what
the state's guarantee means and how it applies in the case at hand.").
19 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
20 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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I. THE WARREN COURT'S CRIMINAL PROCEDUREJURISPRUDENCE
AND THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL BIAS
Surely, no aspect of the work of the Warren Court drew more fire
than its role in helping to bring about the dismantling of racial
apartheid in twentieth-century America. The Court's labors in this
area include Brown v. Board of Education,2' as well as landmark rulings
in other cases involving race and other issues, such as voting rights-
and public accommodations. - Equally important, the Court also at-
tacked racial bias in another sphere-the enforcement of the crimi-
nal law, particularly police investigative procedure.
Prior to 1961, efforts by the Supreme Court to regulate police
procedure were both infrequent and not particularly substantial.
The Court based these modest efforts on the Due Process Clause: '
the selective incorporation approach had not yet appeared in this
area of law.22 Beginning with Alapp v. Ohio"" in 1961, the Court started
to apply some of the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the states in an
effort to regulate the everyday conduct of police officers, with an eye
to the racial injustice that had often pervaded the relationship be-
tween police and minority groups.
Much of this new constitutional rulemaking was aimed at con-
straining police discretion. From the Reconstruction period onward,
law enforcement had played a key role in the harassment and intimi-
dation of minorities, particularly blacks.2 This sometimes took the
21 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22 See Baker v. Carr, 369 US. 186 (1962) (examining reapportionment).
23 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (holding that Congress
had the power under the Commerce Clause to pass Title II of the Civil Rights Act and that the
Act prohibited discrimination in a public hotel).
- See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprie any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law...
See grnerally LAFAVE, CRtMINIAL PROCEDURE, supra note 8, § 2.4 (explaining the Court's due
process cases in criminal procedure before the adoption of the selective incorporation ap-
proach in this area of law).
2 367 US. 643 (1961).
27 See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L Meares, Foreword: The Coming Cisis of CnmmalPredure 86
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1156 (1998) (describing the use of law enforcement to harass, intimidate, and
even murder blacks and other minorities from the close of Reconstruction to the modern civil
rights movement). See also RANDALL KENNED; RACE, CRLME. AND THE LkW 76-135 (1997) (de-
scribing the unequal protection afforded to minorities by law enforcement beginning with pre-
Civil War era); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Prinaplea, 107 HARV. L REV. 820, 839-
40 (1994) (suggesting that the changes in law enforcement institutions and race relations dur-
ing the nineteenth and twentieth centuries provided the basis for the creation of modern
Fourth Amendment law); Debra Lvingston, PoliceDisrttion and the Quality of Lfe in Public Plaes:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L REv'. 551, 596-600 (1997) (describing
how law enforcement used vagrancy laws and police procedure to harass minorities); Williamnj.
Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procdure and CnminalJusice, 107 YALE L.J. 1. 5
(1997) ("The post-1960 constitutionalization of criminal procedure arose, in large part, out of
the sense that the system -as treating black suspects and defendants much worse than white
ones").
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form of abusive use of open-ended investigation; even more often,
blacks found themselves subject to "chronic, low-level harassment"
with vagrancy laws and other so-called public order offenses.28 All of
these racially-tainted practices informed the Warren Court's criminal
procedure cases; institutionalized racial bias in law enforcement
forms their underlying context.2 Talking about these cases without
understanding the critical role that race played is like trying to ex-
plain to an extraterrestrial visitor what a fish is without mentioning
the existence of water.
One of the best examples of a Warren Court criminal procedure
case decided against this background is Teny v. Ohio.30 Terny's main
thrust was to validate temporary, limited searches and seizures-
"stops and frisks"-based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
and the presence of weapons; probable cause would henceforth no
longer be required ., But this simple statement of the Teny "rule"
cannot begin to convey its importance in the racial context of the
time in which the Court decided it. Just a few months before the
Court issued its opinion in Teny, an assassin killed Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr., and racial unrest that had plagued large urban centers in
previous years flared again. Just three months before Terry, the
report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (often
called the Kerner Commission) explained the connection between
the urban riots of the 1960's and police conduct toward minorities in
unambiguous terms. Hostility between blacks and police was a major
factor-indeed, sometimes the precipitating factor-in several of
these riots.
Negroes firmly believe that police brutality and harassment occur
repeatedly in Negro neighborhoods. This belief is unquestionably
one of the major reasons for intense Negro resentment against the
police.3
The Kerner Commission's report was not the first to make this
point. Just a year before, the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and the Administration of Justice had come to a very simi-
28 See Kahan & Meares, supra note 27, at 1156.
29 See, e.g., id. at 1156 and cases cited therein (noting that "[n]early all the landmark proce-
dure cases of the 1960's and early 1970's arose from this [racial] context"); Steiker, supra note
28, at 838, 843-44.
30 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31 Id. at 30.
32 See, e.g., Widespread Disorders, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1968, at Al (cataloguing outbreaks of
violence that occurred in the wake of Dr. King's murder); Mobs Run Wild in the Nation's Capital,
U.S. NEWS & WoRLD REP., Apr. 15, 1968, at 8 (reporting rioting in Washington, D.C., where
"[n]egro mobs terrorized the Nation's capital, burning, looting, beating whites, attacking police
and firemen and threatening wholesale slaughter.").
33 Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 158 (1968). The Report
noted that police departments had begun to adopt so-called aggressive patrol tactics utilizing
stops and frisks, "without weighing their tension-creating effects [between police and blacks]
and the resulting relationship to civil disorder." Id. at 159-60.
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lar conclusion. The Commission wrote that:
Misuse of field interrogation ... is causing serious friction with minority
groups in many localities. This is becoming particularly true as more po-
lice departments adopt "aggressive patrol," in which officers are encour-
aged routinely to stop and question persons on tie street who are un-
known to them, who are suspicious, or whose purpose for being abroad is
not readily evident.3
In case the Justices had somehow missed ie unmistakable evidence
in these reports and elsewhere that racial injustice at tie hands of the po-
lice was unavoidably intertwined with the issues in Ter.', the amicus brief
filed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund made the point
in the starkest possible terms. It leaves little doubt that how police
treated minorities in street encounters was a matter of grave concern to
those combating discrimination against blacks. According to the
NAACP:
The ill effects of stop and frisk practices, particularly in the ghetto, is
as strong at least as any evidence of their good effects "from a purely law
enforcement point of view."... We are gravely concerned by the dan-
gers of legitimating stop and frisk, and thus encouraging, and increasing
the frequency of occasions for, police-citizen aggressions. Speaking
bluntly, we believe that what the ghetto does not need is more stop and
frisk.
The Court's opinion in Tery, which emerged against this back-
ground, could not be mistaken for an effort to protect citizens from
overly aggressive policing. In fact, the decision extended the ability
of police to make an intrusion that crossed then-existing Fourth
Amendment lines, with less evidence than many had previously
thought required.36 In short, Teny is a decision favoring law enforce-
ment enabling it to act more quickly and aggressively and with less
evidence than permitted under preexisting law." Nevertheless, it is
also unmistakably clear that the Court understood that certain ag-
gressive police practices, including stops and frisks, disproportion-
ately impacted minorities, particularly urban blacks. These tactics-
"the wholesale harassment by certain elements of the police commu-
nity, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently com-
plain"8--often exacerbated tensions between police and communi-
ties of color. The Supreme Court wrote:
We have noted that the abusive practices which play a major, though by
34 United States President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of
Justice, Task Force Report: The Police 184 (1967).
S5 Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., as micus Curiae, at 60-62,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (Nos. 63, 74, and 67) (quoting Herman Goldstein. Poice Pohy
Formulation A ProosalforlmprovingPolicePerfonrancr 65 MIcH. L REv. 1123, 1140 (1967)).
Teriy, 392 U.S. at 30.
See David A. Harris, Frisking Every Susped: The IlMthering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAvIS L RE'. 1.
13-14 (1994) ("At bottom, Teny dearly favors the police, regardless of the care %ith which the
Court seemed to balance the needs of law enforcement against the rights of citizens.").
S Teny, 392 U.S. at 14.
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no means exclusive, role in creating this friction are not susceptible of
control by means of the exclusionary rule, and cannot properly dictate
our decision with respect to the powers of the police in genuine investi-
gative and preventive situations. However, the degree of community re-
sentment aroused by particular practices is clearly relevant to an assess-
ment of the quality of the intrusion upon reasonable expectations of
personal security caused by those practices.
These words may appear a bit puzzling. The Court appeared to
give credence to the idea that aggressive police practices like stops
and frisks impact blacks and other minorities disproportionately. At
the same time, it says that it will not require the use of the exclusion-
ary rule in these situations, since excluding evidence cannot affect
police conduct not targeted at securing evidence. Understandably,
commentators have drawn different implications from these seem-
ingly opposed strands of argument. 40 Nevertheless, the effect of racial
discrimination by law enforcement did indeed make up an important
part of what the Supreme Court hoped to accomplish. By acknowl-
edging the racial implications of the police practices it decided to al-
low and regulate, it brought the issue within the realm of proper con-
sideration in constitutional criminal procedure. Terry represents a
clear signal that the racial aspects of police procedure did indeed
make a difference, and could be addressed in discussion of the con-
stitutional regulation of police procedure.
II. THE SUPREME COURT ABDICATES: RACIALJUSTICE
AND WHREN V. UNITED STATES
Twenty-eight years after Terry, the Court decided Whren v. United
States.4  In Wren, the Court confronted a police practice just as
common as the street-level stops and frisks at issue in Terry--the use
of traffic infractions as a pretext (an excuse) to stop and investigate
citizens about whom the police have no basis for suspicion of crimi-
nal involvement. In Whren, police officers followed the car of two
young African-American men based on a suspicion of drug activity."
The police saw nothing to indicate that the defendants were commit-
ting a crime; but, when the officers saw the vehicle violate the traffic
code, they pulled it over and immediately observed contraband in
39 Id. at 17 n.14.
40 Compare, e.g., Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 956, 965, 971-72 (arguing that this language exhibits a minimizing
of racial concerns and a stripping of race out of the case) and Adina Schwartz, "Just Take Away
Their Guns". The Hidden Racism of Terry v. Ohio, FORDHx\M URB. L.J. 317 (1996) (arguing that
while Teny acknowledged racial concerns, the opinion made racial facts and arguments irrele-
vant to the decision), with Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 333,
365 (1998) (noting that while evidence of racial harassment may not have been decisive, it was
clearly a central matter to the Court).
4' 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
4 Id. at 808, 811.
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plain view.' The legal issue, which had split a number of federal cir-
cuit courts of appeal," was what legal standard would apply to these
pretext stops. The defendants argued that a traffic offense should
constitute probable cause only when a reasonable officer would have
made the stop; if a reasonable officer would not have bothered with
the traffic offense, it could not be a sufficient legal basis for the stop.
The Court disagreed, stating that any time a police officer could have
stopped the vehicle-that is, any time the officer observed a traffic of-
fense-this constituted probable cause, and the actual motivation for
the stop-not traffic enforcement, but something else entirely-did
not matter.4 The defendants made sure that the Justices knew the
implications of such a decision. In their briefs, the defendants told
the Court in no uncertain terms that the government's objective
standard would give police almost unlimited discretionary power to
stop any driver at any time, and that police would almost certainly use
this power to stop minorities, especially African-Americans, in num-
bers well out of proportion to their presence on the road."" Indeed,
the briefs even cited recent statistics from studies in Maryland and
New Jersey that substantiated this very fact. Thus, as in TeY, the
Justices could not have missed the racial context of Wihqren; it was
there before them in black and white.
Perhaps it is the absolute certainty that the Justices knew the racial
implications of their decision that makes the Whtren opinion so strik-
ing. Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Scalia said that the Court
had indeed heard the racial argument," but had decided it had noth-
ing to do with the Fourth Amendment."" Of course, the Constitution
forbids racially biased law enforcement, Scalia said, but if this hap-
pens, those aggrieved should look not to the Fourth Amendment and
its exclusionary rule but to the Equal Protection Clause,"' presumably
43 Id at 809.
4The federal circuits had dhided, uith some ruling that any time an officer could hate made
a traffic stop, based on a traffic infraction, it was legitimate for the officer to do so. S&eWhren v.
United States, 53 F.3d 371,374-76 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Botero-Ospina. 71 F.3d 783,
787 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242. 247 (3d Cir. 1995);
United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-84 (2d Cir. 1994). cmt. dvized, 513 U.S. 877 (1994);
United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 389-91 (6th Cir. 1993) (cn bane) at-L derned, 513 U.S. 828
(1994); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729-30 (4th Cir. 1993). a71 derted, 513 U.S. 827
(1994); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498. 500-01 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Trigg.
878 F.2d 1037, 1039 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179. 1184 (5th Cir.
1987) (en banc). Two other circuits have ruled that a traffic stop was sufficient to constitute
probable cause only when a reasonable officer would lite made the stop. See United States v.
Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1994); United States. v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704. 709 (11th
Cir. 1986).
45 Wren, 517 U.S. at 811.
46 Id. at811-13.
4 Briefs for Petitioner, IWhren, at 25-27 (No. 95-5841).
4, Id.
9 Wren, 517 U.S. at 810.
5 Id. at 813.
51 I&
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through a civil suit. Brushing the Fourth Amendment aside, the
Court did exactly what the defendants warned against: gave law en-
forcement carte blanche to stop any driver, at any time, with only the
none-too-potent threat of a lawsuit" to deter racially biased law en-
forcement in the face of evidence that this was already happening. The
opinion is a slap in the face to African-Americans and other minority
group members who must suffer the indignities of these stops. But,
just as important, it is a disavowal of one of the basic underlying prin-
ciples of the Supreme Court's criminal procedure cases in the War-
ren era: Racial bias in the enforcement of the criminal law consti-
tuted a disgraceful legacy of the past that could not and would not be
tolerated in the future. Even if, as some argue, Whren represents not
so much a break with the Warren Court's cases as a legacy of that
Court's failure to fully come to grips with racial issues raised by dis-
criminatory policing, one still cannot help but hear Whren's mes-
sage: Whatever else the Fourth Amendment does or used to do, it
will no longer serve as a tool to prevent racially biased policing.
This sets the stage for a return to our initial question. The new
federalism says that states can and should set higher standards for the
protection of the rights of the criminally accused than the federal
Constitution requires if their own constitutions point in this direc-
tion. Some state courts have shown some willingness to do this, re-
jecting any number of the Supreme Court's pronouncements on
search and seizure questions. In the nearly four years since the U.S.
Supreme Court decided Whren, how have states reacted?
III. RESPONSES OF STATE COURTS
State court opinions show that a small number of these bodies
have, indeed, responded to Whren in exactly the wayJustice Brennan
advocated: They have found that their state constitutions give citi-
zens a higher degree of protection than the federal constitutional
provisions. In one other state that has not yet confronted Whren di-
rectly, state constitutional and case law indicate that the state's courts
would likely decline to follow Whren. Perhaps most interestingly, all
52 For a catalogue of the formidable array of legal obstacles and practical difficulties plain-
tiffs in such Equal Protection Clause suits would face, see Maclin, supra note 40, at n.22 (detail-
ing the numerous legal and evidentiary burdens plaintiffs in such suits would have to carry);
David A. Harris, 'Driting While Black' and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme Court and Pretex-
tual Traffic Stops, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544, 550-53 (1997) (describing both legal and
practical difficulties plaintiffs in Equal Protection cases face).
53 See Thompson, supra note 40, at 962 ("[Tlhe error actually did not take place in the
Court's recent decision in Whren, but rather three decades earlier in the landmark case of Ten7y
v. Ohio.").
54 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985) (rejecting "totality of cir-
cumstances" test for warrant based on anonymous tip); State v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (NJ.
1987) (rejecting good faith exception); State v. Opperman, 247 N.E.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) (invali.
dating use of automobile inventory searches under the state constitution).
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of these cases refer explicitly to the race of the defendants as a factor
in their decisions. The racial legacy of the Warren Court's criminal
procedure cases lives in these decisions, at tie very least as an unmis-
takable subtext. In several other cases, however, state courts have re-
jected state constitutional law challenges to Whren's pretext stop rule.
A. Washington State: State v. Ladson
In State v. Ladson," the Supreme Court of the state of Washington
confronted facts that brought them face to face ith the issue in
Whren: Does a pretext traffic stop comport with the law? There %as
no question that the actions of the police officers involved in the case
constituted a pretext stop: the officers were part of a "proactive gang
patrol," and they explained to the trial court that "they do not make
routine traffic stops while on proactive gang patrol although they use
traffic infractions as a means to pull over people in order to initiate
contact and questioning."5' The officers did not den) that the stop
was pretextual,5' and the Washington Supreme Court was careful to
say that both driver and passenger were black.- After the stop re-
sulted in the arrest of the driver for a suspended license, the police
searched the passenger's belongings and found contraband." The
trial court granted the passenger's motion to suppress because the
officers had engaged in a pretext stop. The state appealed, and the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Miren shortly thereafter. the state in-
termediate appellate court reversed based on lMiren, ithout address-
ing the state constitutional claims the defendant had made.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding that Article 1,
Section 7 of Washington's constitution" provided broader protection
against pretext stops than the federal Fourth Amendment. Carefully
parsing the state constitutional provision, the court declared that it
"'clearly expresses an individual's right to pri%acy Nith no express
limitations." 6 ' Turning to the central argument, the court explained
its view of pretext stops under the "unique and substantially greater
protection" afforded by the Washington constitution. The court
noted:
We have observed that ultimately our state constitutional provision is de-
signed to guard against unreasonable search and seizure.... However,
the problem with a pretextual traffic stop is that it is a search or seizure
which cannot be constitutionallyjustified for its true reason (i.e., specula-
55 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999).
SId at 836.
57Id
58ld
"
59Id
60 .No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home inwded, uithout author-
ity of law." WASH. CONST. amt 1, § 7.
1Ladson, 979 P.2d at 837 (quoting State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593 (1994)).
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tive criminal investigation) but only for some other reason (i.e., to en-
force traffic code) which is at once lawfully sufficient but not the real rea-
son. Pretext is therefore a triumph of form over substance; a triumph of
expediency at the expense of reason. But it is against the standard of
reasonableness which our constitution measures exceptions to the gen-
eral rule, which forbids search or seizure without a warrant. Pretext is re-
62
sult without reason.
The court in Ladson sees the pretext stop doctrine for what it is-a
legally-sanctioned result given a mask of legitimacy by objective rules.
This is exactly the type of decision Justice Brennan envisioned-
grounded completely in state constitutional law, more protective of
the rights of citizens than the federal Constitution, and boldly unde-
terred by arguments for uniformity. In addition, the opinion ac-
knowledged the racial context of the issue, even if it did not empha-
size it. By noting the race of the defendants in describing the reason
for the stop, the court makes the issue plain: a pretext stop was made
in the case because, at least in part, driver and passenger were black.
This seems a fair inference to draw; otherwise, there is absolutely no
other reason to mention this fact in the opinion.
B. New York: People v. Dickson
In People v. Dickson,63 a court in New York confronted Whren's pre-
text rule in yet another case involving a traffic stop in which race
likely played a role.6 Police engaged in an unrelated undercover
drug operation observed a group of three people of different races in
a car. After an illegal U-turn, the defendant joined the other three
persons in the car, and it drove off. The police had observed no
criminal conduct, but apparently became so suspicious that they
aborted the entire drug operation, pursued the car, and stopped it
after nine or ten blocks for the illegal U-turn. Officers recovered a
small amount of cocaine from the defendant. The officer in charge
testified frankly that he would not have aborted the drug operation to
stop the car just for a traffic violation;65 in other words, the stop was
based on a pretext, pure and simple.
The court analyzed the actions of the police in the context of
prior New York decisions. Noting that the state's highest court had
not, since VWren, expressly passed on the question of whether New
62 Id. at 838.
690 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1998).
This is more than just speculation based on the racial composition of the group in the car.
The court noted that "[w]hile denying that the racial composition of the men in the car had
served to enhance his suspicions, [the officer] admitted on cross-examination that he might
have told the defendant after his arrest that he should have left the group's one white male at
home." Id. at 392. In other words, the officer admitted that he might have told the defendant
that the racial mix of people in the car did, indeed, make a difference, notwithstanding his an-
swer to the direct question whether this factor enhanced his suspicions.
65 ME.
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York's constitution and law permitted pretext stops, the court said
that it still seemed clear that Wiren could not stand in New York. The
state had long had its own rule on pretext stops-the primary motiva-
tion test. Examining the evidence to determine both the objective
and subjective reasons for the stop, if the police acted primarily to en-
force the traffic laws, the presence of a traffic violation will constitute
a sufficient legal basis for the stop.'" But if the eidence shows that
the police acted not primarily to enforce traffic laws but instead for
constitutionally inadequate reasons-e.g., investigation of a crime
based on a hunch or unsubstantiated suspicion-courts imalidate
these stops.67
The opinion in Dickson notes that a number of New York interme-
diate appellate court cases had all confronted lVI7ren and concluded,
relying at least implicitly on the New York constitution, that the state
rule against pretext stops remains in place."" One of these cases re-
jecting Whren relied strongly on People v. Scott,' a 1992 case in which
New York's highest court discussed the state's own constitutional pro-
tections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Scott court
wrote:
Although the language of the State and Federal constitutional proscrip-
tions against unreasonable searches and seizures generally tends to sup-
port a policy of uniformity, we have not hesitated in the past to interpret
article I, section 12 of the State Constitution independently of its Federal
counterpart when necessary to assure that our State's citizens are ade-
quately protected from unreasonable government intrusions."°
Since Whren explicitly purported not to announce a change in the
law but only to re-enunciate a rule in place since 1973,"' the court in
Dickson concluded that the proper decision xias to follow New York's
rule disallowing pretext stops, which the state's courts had followed
since well before Whren.
C. New Jersey. State v. Kennedy and State v. Soto
Cases from New Jersey illustrate another way that states have dealt
with the issues presented in 9lWtren. While agreeing with the idea pre-
sented in Whren that questions concerning police motive have no
place in the analysis of pretext stops, courts in New Jersey have come
to the conclusion under their own law that racially-biased law en-
forcement practices create cognizable legal injuries that courts may
6Id- at 394
6 Id.
6s Id- 394-95.
593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992).
70 Id. at 1342 (citations omitted).
1 In Mtzren, the Court restated that a traffic-violation arrest as well as a post-arrest search are
valid even if the arrest is a pretext for a narcotics search. Se l7Wirev, 517 U.S. at 812-13 (citing
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) and Gustafson v. Florida, 41-1 U.S. 260 (1973)).
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address through the suppression of evidence.
In State v. Kennedy,' African-American defendants in several con-
solidated cases claimed that police stopped them because of their
race. These stops all led to searches that uncovered contraband. The
opinion concerned the defendants' selective prosecution claim." De-
fendants had requested discovery of several types of records in order
to attempt to substantiate their claims, and the state refused. Kennedy
thus presented the court with an unusual situation-allegations of ra-
cially-biased law enforcement activity in the context of a discovery re-
quest to support a claim of selective prosecution.74
The court granted the defendants access to the records they
sought, stating that they had met the burden of showing a "colorable
basis" for their claim.8 But the more significant aspect of the case for
our purposes is the court's discussion of the very issues underlying
Wren. The court in Kennedy explicitly adopted the objective ap-
proach to police stops, exactly as Whren did five years later. This ap-
proach questioned "whether the conduct of the law enforcement of-
ficer who undertook the search was objectively reasonable, without
regard to his or her underlying motives or intent."76 The court cited
many federal cases to support its conclusions. But almost in the
same breath, the court in Kennedy restated the continuing vitality of
NewJersey's unique rule-the exclusion of evidence based on racially
discriminatory law enforcement.7 Allegations of racially biased law
enforcement, the court said, were different than inquiring into the
motivations of individual officers; rather, the defendants sought in-
formation concerning an alleged course of conduct, evidence of
which could show up in statistics, records, or even departmental poli-
cies.76 Since exclusion of evidence aims both to deter police wrong-
doing and to assure judicial integrity,"° these goals would be well
served by the use of this remedy when defendants make claims of ra-
7 588 A.2d 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
73 Defendants claimed that even if, viewed in isolation, their arrests were objectively reason-
able, they "were tainted by a long-standing, systematic practice of invidious discrimination
against minorities reflected in the selective enforcement of NewJersey's traffic laws." Id. at 837.
The y alleged that the materials they had requested in discovery would support them. Id.
Since Kennedy, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided a very similar case. See United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 454 (1996) (considering discovery request in the context of claim of se-
lective prosecution of African-Americans for crack cocaine offenses, in which particular U.S.
Attorney's Office had prosecuted more than twenty such cases, the overwhelming majority of
which involved African-American defendants).
76 Kennedy, 588 A.2d at 840.
76 Id. at 837.
77 Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 10 (1989); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,
470 (1985); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210,
214 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986); State v. Bruzzese, 94 NJ.
210, 219-221 (1983)).
78 Kennedy, 588 A.2d at 838.
89 Id.-
80 Id. at 838-39.
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cial bias in law enforcement" Citing many New Jersey cases, the
court took pains to explain that "we live with a legacy of a racist past"
in this country; and, that while discrimination today takes more sub-
de forms, it remains a pernicious evil that the state must eradicateY'
While not a case that explicitly focused on the constitutionality of
pretext stops, Kennedy looms large as a statement of New Jersey law
and policy on the subject. It would be impossible not to understand
that the court intends to rid the criminal justice system of searches
and seizures based on race. And if that takes suppression of proba-
tive evidence of criminal activity, so be it. It is a price the state must
pay to deter "police officers who invade the privacy of citizens as a
means of racist or political harassment.""s
State v. Soto4 continued this line of thinking. In Solo, defendants
claimed that police stopped them-African-American and Litino
drivers-based on race. Evidence in the case supported these
claims. Statistics showed that while approxinately thirteen percent of
the drivers on the highw%-ay in question were black, nearly thirty-six
percent of those stopped, questioned, searched, and arrested were
black.' A statistical expert in the case testified that it w-s "highly tin-
likely such statistics could have occurred randomly or by chance.- ' -
In addition, the evidence showed that the state police command
structure and hierarchy had done much to encourage and even con-
done this behavior by officers." The court said that in such a context,
Kennedy and other New Jersey cases called for the exclusion of evi-
dence.
[W]here objective evidence establishes "that a police agency has em-
barked upon an officially sanctioned or de fado policy of targeting mi-
norities for investigation and arrest," any evidence seized will be sup-
pressed to deter future insolence in office by those charged ith
enforcement of the law and to maintain judicial integrity.
In case Kennedy, was not clear enough, Soto makes the point even
more directly: Under New Jersey law, courts will scrutinize allega-
tions of racially-biased pretext stops with great care. If the facts sub-
stantiate charges of racially-biased law enforcement, the court must
suppress the evidence in order to deter this conduct. In other words,
this is a remedy that exists apart from the question of pretext stops,
but it addresses Whren's implications-law enforcement actions that
disproportionately impact people of color-head on, by applying the
81 Id. at 839.
82
83 d
734 A-2d 350 (NJ. Super. CL Law Div. 1996).
5 Id. at 352.
Id. at 353.
87 ME.
Id. at 357-60.
Id. at 360 (quoting State v. Kenywai 588 A.2d 834 (N.J. 1991)).
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exclusionary rule."
D. Acceptance ofWhren Under State Constitutions:
Tennessee and Ohio
In at least two states, courts have faced the question whether or
not their state constitutions bar the use of pretext stops. Both con-
cluded that their state constitutional provisions governing search and
seizure dovetailed with the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in
Whren.
The Tennessee Supreme Court decided the issue in State v. Vine-
yard.9' Officers suspected the defendants of involvement with mari-
juana trafficking. They used traffic violations as a justification to stop
the defendant's vehicle, and the resulting search uncovered contra-
band. The defendants argued that, while pretext stops might indeed
meet the federal constitutional standard in Whren, they nevertheless
do not comply with Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitu-
tion.92 That provision, defendants said, afforded the citizens of Ten-
nessee more protection than the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected this argument,
finding the Tennessee provision co-extensive with the Fourth
Amendment.93 Departing from Fourth Amendment interpretations is
appropriate, the court said, only where using the federal standard
would require a departure from settled state law, or when linguistic
differences between the two justify different interpretations.9 Nei-
ther of these was the case in Vineyard, the court said, and it found its
own cases that purported to disapprove of pretext stops unpersuasive.
An Ohio appellate court followed the same path in State v.
Dennewitz.95 Faced with a pretext stop, the court eschewed any con-
cern for the officer's ulterior motive in the stop. Both the U.S. Su-
preme Court (in Whren) and the Ohio Supreme Court (in Dayton v.
Erickson)9 6 "have rejected the notion that pretextual stops are uncon-
90 It is certainly true that under the Kennedy/Soto rule, police could perform pretext stops
based on some criterion other than race, and those would not be objectionable. For example,
police might use traffic offenses to target those who traffic in guns, or who drink and drive, in
situations in which race is not thought to have any predictive value. While such pretext stops
would present the danger of the abuse of police power in a general sense-something that is
certainly not trivial-my concern here is with the abuse of these powers in ways that have a de-
cidedly racial cast.
91 958 S.W.2d 730 (Tenn. 1997).
Article I, Section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution provides "[tihat the people shall be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures ...."
93 See Vineyar, 958 S.W.2d at 731 ("[A] stop based upon probable cause is valid under the
Tennessee Constitution, without regard to the actual subjective motivations of police officers.").
94 Id. at 733-34.
95 No. 99 CA 2491 (Ohio Ct App. Nov. 5,1999).
76 Ohio St. 3d. 3, 11 (1996). Following the Whren decision by just days but for some rea-
son not citing it, the Ohio Supreme Court used Erickson to announce a clarification of the split
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stitutional,"97 the court said. Yes, the stop w% as a pretext, but "[a] pre-
textual stop is not an unreasonable seizure within the meaning of the
Ohio or United States Constitutions."""
Courts in other states faced with the question of the state constitu-
tionality of pretext stops have deferred decisions, preferring to re-
ceive clarification from higher courts in their states before deciding
whether their state constitutions support or reject the Wh7ren rule. In
State v. Caldwe, the Delaware Superior Court decided that the de-
fendant's argument that the Delaware Constitution did not allow for
pretextual stops was "better suited at the appellate level where the
Delaware Supreme Court can be afforded the opportunity to address
whether the Whren decision is a consistent interpretation of the State
of Delaware's Constitution."1°0 And in Darby v. State,"0 ' a case that be-
gan with a stop ostensibly for the violation of driving with a cracked
windshield and ended in a drug arrest, the Court of Appeals of Geor-
gia refused to answer the defendant's argument that the Georgia
Constitution provided greater protection to citizens of the state than
did the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. "This is a ques-
tion of constitutional construction which will have to be decided by
the Supreme Court of Georgia. " "t
E. State Cases Interpreting Federal Law: The More Traditional Rate
More common than decisions that either accept or reject 117iren
based on state constitutional law are cases in which courts use more
traditional methods of analysis to interpret It19ren. For example, in
Witehead v. State,03 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals examined
a pretextual traffic stop in which the defendant's detention extended
beyond the point necessary to determine that his driver's license, ve-
hicle registration, and warrant status were in order.' During this
continued custody, the officer took a variety of actions that, he said,
were designed "to judge the person's reaction to ... [decide]
of authority, id at 6, on the question of pretext stops in Ohio courts. The court's opinion was
clear and unequivocal:
a traffic stop based upon probable cause is not unreasonable, and ... an officer who
makes a traffic stop based on probable cause acts in an objectively reasonable nanner.
Accordingly, we ... hold that where a police officer stops a vehicle based on probable
cause that a traffic violation has occurred or %.s occurring, the stop is not unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution even if the officer had
some ulterior motive for making the stop, such as a suspicion that the violator us engag-
ing in more nefarious criminal activity.
Idat 11.
9Dennewitz slip op. at 3.
Id. at 4.
Nos. 9807006121, 9807006069 (Del. Super. 1999).
100 4&, slip op. at 3.
101 521 S.E.2d 438 (Ga. C. App. 1999).
'02 Id. at 441. On procedural grounds, the court refused to transfer the case to the state su-
preme court for a decision on the issue. S&e i&L
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whether I am going to search for contraband or not." °' The defen-
dant's reactions encouraged the officer to search, and use a drug-
sniffing dog, which resulted in the recovery of cocaine in a back-
pack.1" The court noted that under Whren it did not matter that the
police were motivated by something other than traffic enforcement,
but it put a decidedly unfriendly gloss on this practice.
By all indications, pretextual traffic stops have increased markedly
all over the country since the Whren decision. Using the traffic laws as
pretexts for stopping to search the occupants and the interior of the
vehicles has created intense criticism and some allegations of racism
in the enforcement of the laws of Maryland, as well as in other
states.
107
Since the record contained no evidence on allegations of racism,
the court took no position on them, but it noted pointedly that both
the defendant and his passenger were African-Americans."" The
court said that, although pretext stops had become a standard anti-
narcotics strategy, police must still comply with settled search and sei-
zure rules, including those in Maryland case law. Under those cases,
police using pretext stops cannot detain motorists beyond the time
necessary to resolve any traffic issues.' °9 Further, when traffic en-
forcement serves as the pretext for a stop, police may not engage in
activities unrelated to traffic enforcement in order to attempt to ob-
serve indications of other types of illegal activity."' An interpretation
of Whren consistent with Maryland cases on the subject of pretext
stops "requires the police to issue the citation or warning efficiently
and expeditiously with a minimum of intrusion, only that which is re-
quired to carry forth the legitimate, although pretextual, purpose for
the stop.""' In other words, Whitehead does not rule out pretext stops
based on state constitutional law; instead, it interprets Whren nar-
rowly, in light of Maryland's existing case law, and limits its reach
considerably.
In Ohio, one of the states that has rejected a challenge to Whren
based on its state constitution, 2 several courts have limited Whren in
a traditional fashion similar to Whitehead. For example, in State v.
Montoya,ll3 a police officer stopped a driver for speeding. He began
to question the driver about facts unrelated to the violation; almost
103 698 A.2d 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997).
14 Id at 1116.
105 Id
106 Id
107 I. at 1117 (citations omitted).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 1117-18 (citing Snow v. State, 578 A.2d 816 (Md. App. 1990), and Mumnafo v. State,
660 A.2d 1068 (Md. App. 1995)).
no Id. at 1120.
111 d
1:2 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
1 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 824 (Mar. 6, 1998).
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simultaneously with the traffic stop, a canine officer arrived with a
drug-sniffing dog. The officer who stopped the vehlide immediately
ordered the canine officer to use the dog to perform a drug search.'"
The trial court granted the defendant's motion to suppress the nar-
cotics that the police recovered, and the appellate court affirmed.
Characterizing the officer's actions after the stop as a "fishing expedi-
tion,""5 the appellate court said that:
based on his experience as a state trooper, [the officer] had a reasonable
and articulable suspicion that Montoya uras breaking a traffic law by driv-
ing over the posted speed limit. Thus, his initial stop of appellees' vehi-
cle was justified. [The officer's] subsequent questions, however, were ir-
relevant to the purpose of the stop and he thereby unlawfully expanded
the scope of the detention.1
6
In other words, the court accepted 119tren, but used Ohio case law
to give Whren a grudging reading, just as the Maryland court had in
Whitehead. Hardly "new federalism," but worth noting as part of the
whole picture when examining how state courts have reacted to
Whren.
IV. UNANTICIPATED CONSEQUENCES: LEGISLATIVE, ADMINISTRATIVE,
AND OTHER "OLD FEDERALISM" RESPONSES
When we think of the new federalism, we think of courts. The
theory's early exponents had judicial responses in mind when they
urged the preservation of the Warren Court legacy: their writing
aims to influence those litigating and deciding cases in state courts.
The idea was to adapt the same tactic used throughout the 1960's-
litigation based on a constitutional-level guarantee, but at the state
level. Other institutions that might provide some of the relief sought
through other institutional devices were largel)-perhaps wholl)-
ignored.
Nevertheless, one cannot think about responses to ligiren without
considering several unexpected, even surprising, developments that
have come from other, nonjudicial institutions. Indeed, these re-
sponses to Whren have proven perhaps more important, and certainly
more dynamic, than those coming from courts; which, after all, are
relatively slow-moving since they can only react to cases before them
and remain institutionally bound by stare decsis to follow authoritative
cases in their own jurisdictions. These reactions have come not from
courts, but from legislatures, law enforcement agencies, and the pub-
lic itself.
11 Id at *2.
15 Id at *5.
116 Id/ at *7.
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A. Legislative Responses
In the wake of the Whren decision, those concerned with the prob-
lem of pretext stops decried the case, explaining its likely implica-
tions-more pretext stops, almost certainly targeted at minorities."'
The first legislative response to Whren came just six months later-the
federal Traffic Stops Statistics Act of 1997,'"s sponsored by Represen-
tative John Conyers. This bill, the first of its kind, would have re-
quired that all police departments keep data on each traffic stop
made, including the race and ethnicity of the driver, the reason for
the stop, whether any search was performed and its legal basis, and
what, if any, evidence was recovered.1 9 The Department of Justice
would then collect and analyze the data.20  The bill constituted a
modest first step-a way of understanding and coming to grips with
the existence and scope of the problem. If the statistics gathered
bore out the concerns that African-Americans and other minorities
had long expressed, the results could then form the basis for further,
more substantive action. The bill passed the House of Representa-
tives unanimously in March of 1998,12' but the Senate held no hear-
ings on it before the end of the Congress.'"
House Report 118 (now H.R. 1443123) is still not law, and while
there are reasons to be more optimistic about its chances than a year
ago, it may never pass Congress, given that body's current conserva-
tive majority. Nevertheless, it has already had an effect few might
have anticipated: It has spawned a host of state-level bills across the
country. These bills are almost all clones of the Conyers bill, as they
call for data collection on all traffic stops for a particular period of
time, and then mandate a statistical analysis. All have been "custom-
ized" for the circumstances of their individual states. Although none
is perfect, almost all of them make collection of data mandatory-the
centerpiece of the Conyers approach. As of this writing, legislators
11 See, e.g., Diana Roberto Donahoe, "Could Have," "Would Have:" What the Supreme Court
Should Have Decided in Whren v. United States., 34 AM. CRIM L. REV. 1193 (1997); Christopher
Hall, Challenging Selective Enforcement of Traffic Regulations After the Disharnonic Convergence:
Whren v. United States, United States v. Armstrong, and the Evolution of Police Discretion, 76 TEX.
L. REV. 1083 (1998); Timothy P. O'Neill, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Probable Cause, Beyond the Fourth
Amendment: New Strategies for Fighting Pretext Arrests, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 693 (1998); David A.
Harris, 'Driving While Black, supra note 52.
118 The Traffic Stops Statistics Act, H.R. 118, 105th Cong. (1997).
119 Id. at § 2(2).
120 Id. at § 3.
12 The Traffic Stops Statistics Act, supra note 118.
122 The Senate delayed holding hearings on the bill, and by the end of the session the entire
government was involved in the impeachment process. The measure expired at the end of the
session.
123 H.R. 118 died at the end of the 105th Congress, but was reintroduced in 1999 as H-.R.
1443, The Traffic Stops Study Statistics Act. The new bill is similar to H.R. 118; the major dif-
ference is that instead of calling for a nationwide study, it mandates gathering of data from a
select number of representative police departments.
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have introduced bills in more than a third of the states, including
Ohio, 124 Illinois,12 Pennsylvania,'l6 Oklahoma,'r
' South Carolina, '"
Massachusetts,' 2' Rhode Island,' Virginia,'' Maryland,'I Florida,'"
Kentucky,14 Alabama,'3 Iowa," Kansas,' Tennessee,'" Georgia,'
Wisconsin,14° Missouri,'"' Washington State," and NewJersey.'" Two
of these bills have become law. In North Carolina, the first state to
pass such a bill, all state law enforcement officers will collect fifteen
points of data on each traffic stop they make.'" In Connecticut, the
124 H.B. 363, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1999) (requiring statewide collection of stausucs on
all traffic stops).
1 H.B. 3911, 91st Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (II. 2000) (requiring collection of traffic stop stais-
H.B. 1649, 182d Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999) (requiring collection of data on traffic
stops in most to the state's largest municipalities); sme also H.B. 2157. 182d Gen.Ass., Reg. Sess.
(Pa.1999) (requiring training for law enforcement officers).
7 S. 1444, 47th Leg., 2d. Sess. (OkIa. 2000) (requiring municipal police departments,
county sheriff's offices, and department of public safety to collect statistics on all traffic stops).
S. 915, 114th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2000) (mandating particular anti-profiling pol-
icy); see also the predecessor bill, S. 778, 113th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1999) (requiring the
collection of traffic stop data by the Highway Patrol and the State Police).
1 S. 1180, 181st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mfass. 1999) (requiring the collection and stud, of infor-
mation relating to routine traffic stops).
S. 2143, 2000 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2000) (requiring data collection and authorizing attor-
ney general to conduct a study of all routine traffic stops). H.B. 7164 is die same bill. There
was a predecessor to the current bill. H.B. 8430, 2000 Leg., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 1998) (requiring
superintendent of the state police to keep statistical data on traffic stops and publish it annu-
S. 743, 2000 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000) (requiring superintendent of state police to
keep statistical data on all traffic stops). A predecessor bill called for the establishment of a
subcommittee of the legislature to study the issue. HJ.R. Res. 687, 1999 Leg.. 1st Reg. Ses (Va.
1999).
1 H.B. 225, 414th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Md. 2000) (requiring collection of data on all traffic
stops). The predecessor bill was much weaker. S. 430, 413th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Md. 19 9)
(establishing a task force to study stops for routine traffic tiolations).
1 See H.B. 1113, 102d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.. (Fla. 2000). A predecessor bill, S. 1456, 101st
Le, st Reg. Sess., died in committee on April 30. 1999.
S. 286, 2000 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2000) (requiring police departments to hawe written
antiprofiling policies and to collect data on all traffic stops).
H.B. 7, 181st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ala. 1999) (requiring data collection in connection %-ith
seat belt law); S. 374, 181st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2000) (forbidding profiling and requiring
police departments to have tritten anti-profiling policies and to collect data on all traffic stops).
S. 2183, 78th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Iowa 2000) (requiring police departments to collect
data on all traffic stops).
IS7 H.B. 2683, 78th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000) (requiring that proposals be sought for
traffic stops study that would include data collection).
133 S. 2415, 101st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2000) (requiring data collection on traffic stops).
1S9 S. 376, 145th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2000) (condemning racial profiling).
140 S. 354, 94th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (i'is. 2000) (requiring data collection on traffic stops).
1 H.B. 2056, 90th Leg., 2d. Sess. (Mo. 2000) (requiting police departments to collect data
on all traffic stops).
142 S. 6683, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2000) (requiring data collection on traffic stops).
143 S. 863, 209th Leg. (NJ. 2000) (requiring the superintendent of state police to collect and
analyze data on all traffic stops); A.B. 3502, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000) (criminal charges): S. 650
209th Leg. (N.J. 2000) (filing of complaints).
4 An Act to Require the Ditision of Criminal Statistics to Collect and Maintain Statistics on
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law now requires each police agency in the state to record and retain
five points of data for each traffic stop, including the race or ethnicity
of the driver.145 These data would then become the basis for a state-
wide study.146 Connecticut's statute also explicitly bans profiling and
making stops based solely on race, and requires every police depart-
ment in the state to have an antiprofiling policy in place by Jan. 1,
2000.147 Two other bills-one in California 148 and one in Wiscon-
sin'49-suffered gubernatorial vetoes150 after passing their respective
state legislatures. Nevertheless, there are more than twice as many
bills pending now than there were at the end of last year, and there is
interest in other states in introducing similar legislation.'' The trend
is unmistakable.
Obviously, when such legislation passes, the landscape changes;
the state legislature has, at such a point, begun to address the impli-
cations of Whren in a very direct, if basic, way. But even when these
bills do not pass, they can serve as the focal point for discussions of
the whole cluster of policing and race issues, of which racial profiling
is but one.
B. Administrative Changes: Responses of Police Departments
to the Racial Profiling Controversy
As some state legislatures began efforts to address the post-Whren
controversy concerning pretext stops and racial profiling, another set
of unexpected responses arose. In fact, given vocal police opposition
Traffic Law Enforcement, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 114-10 (1999) (requiring the collection of infor-
mation "the age, race and sex of the offender.").
145 An Act Concerning Traffic Stops Statistics, 1999 CONN. AGrs 99-198 (Reg. Sess.) (requir-
ing police officers to record the "race, color, ethnicity, gender and age" of people stopped for
traffic violations).
146 Id.
147 See id. (stating that "[t]he race or ethnicity of an individual shall not be the sole factor" in
an officer's decision to stop and search a vehicle, or to make an arrest).
48 S. 1389, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000). A predecessor bill was vetoed in 1999 by
Governor Gray Davis. S.B. 78, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (requiring collection and
analysis of data on routine traffic stops).
The proposal was part of Wisconsin's omnibus two-year budget bill, and as such did not
have its own separate bill number. Telephone Interview with Robert Buchanan, Legislative
Aide to State Senator Gwendolynne Moore (Mar. 13, 2000). A new bill with similar provisions
has been introduced this year, despite last year's veto. S. 354, 94th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wisc.
2000).
15 Carl Ingram, Davis Vetoes Racial Data Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1999, at A3 (noting
that California Governor Gray Davis vetoed the bill because he believes "the state has no busi-
ness scrutinizing local police."); Racial Profiling Panel Holds Its First Meeting, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2000, at 5 (noting that the governor created a panel to study possible racial
profiling by police "shortly after he vetoed a bill" that would have required collection of data on
traffic stops); see also Wisc. Exec. Order No. 28, 94th Leg. Sess. (Dec. 27, 1999) ("Executive Or-
der Relating to the Creation of the Governor's Task Force on Racial Profiling.").
151 See supra notes 124-45 and accompanying text.
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to the Conyers bil, 52 these reactions surprised almost everyone.
In the wake of the passage of the Conyers bill in the U.S. House of
Representatives in March of 1998, law enforcement organizations
mounted a strong campaign against the legislation.'' The National
Association of Police Organization (NAPO), an umbrella group that
purported to represent more than 4,000 police organizations across
the country, led the opposition of the bill. 5' NAPO opposed the bill
because officers would "resent" having to collect this data, and be-
cause, despite statistical evidence, there wvas "no pressing need orjus-
tification" for the legislation.5
Thus, it shocked many when, in February 1999, San Diego Police
Chief Jerome Sanders announced that his agency would become the
first major city police department to begin collecting traffic stop data
on its own initiative, without any federal or state mandate."" His rea-
soning was simple and straightfonward. Sanders, whose police de-
partment had had great success with community policing, put a pre-
mium on his department's relationship with the community. :7  He
knew that for community policing to continue to succeed, he needed
the cooperation and trust of the citizens his department served; he
also knew that there was a perception-right or wrong-that police
stopped, questioned, and searched people of color in numbers out of
proportion to their presence on the road.'" And whether he agreed
with it or not, Sanders knew that overcoming this perception-either
through demonstrating that it was mistaken or by rooting the offen-
sive practice out-depended on obtaining data that would tell the
real story. 9 He ordered data collection to begin early in the next
160year.
In the months after Sanders' announcement, other departments
decided that they, too, would begin collecting traffic stop data, in-
cluding large municipal police departments in San Jose, California,'"'
and Houston, Texas,' 62 and by state police agencies in Washington
1 See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
1 See Robert L.Jackson. Push Against Bias in Traffic Stops Arnsted, L. TITES.June 1. 1998,
atA5 (noting that Senate would most likely vote down te racial-profiling legislation).
154 Id.
155 Id
156 See Michael Stetz & Kelly Thornton, Cops to Colleaf Traffic-Stop Racal Data: S.D. Chij Aca to
Find f Minori, Drivers are Pulled over too Often, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRiw., Feb. 5. 1999. at Al.
157 See id. (noting that Sanders %%as concerned about the groting public perception that po-
lice target minority drivers which %as -eroding public trust and needs to be addressed if com-
munity policing... is to be successful.").
158 Id-
159 Id
160 Id. See alsoJulie Ha, Groups Seek Data on Race-Based Police Stops, L. TIMIES. Apr. 16, 1999. at
B3 (discussing San Diego's decision to collect data because, as a police deparunent spokesman
said, "we as an organization have nothing to hide.).
161 1&
162 S.K. Bardwell & Lori Rodriguez, HPD to Collra Profiling Data; Polie Chie, Maor Wint to
Find Out ifMinoities Unfairly Targetd, HOUSTON CHRONIc3E, Aug. 12.1999, at Al.
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state, ' 63 Florida, " and Michigan,' 65-more than one hundred depart-
ments nationwide.'6 President Clinton has given his public support
to these efforts, even directing federal agencies to begin collecting
data on their own traffic stop activity. 67
Voluntary data collection cannot constitute the whole answer to
these problems. Those agencies that are most open and presumably
have the least significant problems with racially biased traffic stops
will be most likely to step forward; those departments with the biggest
problems will undoubtedly be most reluctant. Thus the picture that
may emerge from voluntary efforts could be skewed, reflecting only
the behavior of the best agencies, and none of the worst behavior of
the worst. Nevertheless, it is difficult not to construe police agencies'
voluntary self-scrutiny of a volatile, currently controversial area of po-
lice/community relations is a net gain for police and local communi-
ties. As a consequence, issues of race, crime, and policing are being
discussed, and (at least some) action is being taken in these commu-
nities.
C. Public Perception and Awareness
The post-Wren controversy has had another unexpected effect: It
has put the issue of race and crime more generally, and racial profil-
ing in particular, on national, state, and local agendas. This discus-
sion, which has helped push forward the legislative and administra-
tive initiatives described above, has changed public perception
concerning policing that impacts particular racial groups in dispro-
portionate ways, and has built awareness of the undesirability of ra-
cially biased policing.
Two examples will illustrate how things have changed. There has
long been a great gulf between the attitudes of blacks and whites
concerning the fairness of the police and the justice system. This was
quite evident in the wake of the O.J. Simpson trial. Polling data
1 Angela Galloway, State Patrol to Note Race, Gender in Stops; Effort is Instituted to Deter Racal
Pro/iling, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 24, 1999, at Al.
Mike Brassfield, Most Believe Racial Stops Widespread, ST. PETERSBURG TiMES, Dec. 11, 1999,
at 3A.
16 David Shepardson, Cops Will LogRace of Drivers, DETROIT NEwS, December 10, 1999, at Al.
1 See Oversight Hearing on the Civil Rights Division of the Department ofJustice Before the House Sib-
comm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, July 12, 2000 (statement of Bill Lan
Lee, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of justice) ("To-
day, our 100 jurisdictions are implementing data collection programs .... "); Scott Bowles, Bans
on Racial Profiling Gain Steam, USA TODAY, June 2, 2000, at 3A (over fifty cities in California
alone began voluntary data collection in 1999).
167 Steven A. Holmes, Clinton Orders Investigation On Possible Racial Profiling, N.Y. TiMiS, June
10, 1999, at A22; Edwin Chen, 'Corrosive'Racial Profiling Must End, Clinton Insists; President Orders
Federal Agencies to Collect Data on People They Stop to Learn if Practice is Taking Place, L.A. TIxW S.
June 10, 1999, at A18; Michael A. Fletcher, Clinton Orders Data Collection In Effort to Halt Racial
Profiling, WASH. POST,June 10, 1999 at A2.
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showed the country was divided along racial lines on the question of
Simpson's guilt,'6s and that blacks perceived the entire criminal jus-
tice system as stacked against them. More recent data show that the
same racial divide still exists, but with a surprising twist. In December
1999, the Gallup Organization released a poll on racial profiling
showing that most blacks and a clear majority of whites believe that ra-
cially-biased pretext stops are a widespread problem."' Moreover,
four out five people of both races characterized profiling as a perni-
cious practice that should be addressed and eliminated.' Surely we
would expect this high level of awareness of the problem and its
negative implications among African-Americans, those most likely to
find themselves stopped. But the data for whites shows that the pub-
lic discussion of the issue, which might not have occurred but for
MWren, has, indeed, educated many other people on the realities of
what people of color face on the street.
These changes in perception and attitude are also visible in media
coverage of the issue. It is interesting, for example, to contrast the
coverage of the Whren decision in 1996, with the coverage of Illinois v.
Wardlow,17' decided just a few weeks ago. 11%ren received rather per-
functory coverage. Many of the largest news organizations did not
feature it prominently,'7 - and even among those that did, few high-
lighted the racial implications of the decision, which had been explic-
itly (if briefly) addressed in Justice Scalia's opinion."% Mardlowv con-
cerned similar issues in the context of a Ten. stop. The defendant in
16 In July of 1994, 66% of whites interviewed said that Simpson ,-s probably guilty. In con-
trast, only 24% of blacks agreed. Frank Newport and iUnda Saad, Civil Tnal Didn't Alter Pubt 's
View of Simpson Cas4 Gallup News Service, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releaiss/
pr970207.asp (Feb. 7, 1997). This same racial division of opinion continued after the erdict in
the Simpson civil case. Almost 70% of whites inteniewed in 1997 say that the civil jun made
the right decision when it found Simpson responsible for the murders, but only 26% of blacks
interviewed say that the civil jury's decision was correct. Id. In a February 1999 poll. not much
had changed: 79% percent of whites say the charges are true, compared to 35% of blacks.
Frank Newport, F/fth Anniversary of A'icole Brown Simpson and Ron Co!dman .turdrs Finds Arm-
cans Stil Pointing at O.J. Simpson, Gallup News Service, at http://ww%-,.galup.com/poll/rclascs/
pr990614.asp (June 14,1999).
169 SeeFrank Newport, Racial Profiling is Seen as lSdesprad, PartwularlwT.Acong YounglBlach .Mn.
Gallup News Service, at http://ww%%.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr991209.asp (Dec. 9. 1999)
(stating that 77% of blacks and 56% of whites said they believed "racial profiling, %%hich was
described in detail, is widespread).
1.0 See id. (stating that 81% of those surveyed disapproved of profiling when asked a question
that is "neutral in tone").
171 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
1 See, eg., Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup: If Traffic Stop Is i'alid, Arrest On Other
Charges Is Ailowed, N.Y. TIMEsJune 11, 1996. at A22 (discussing the Court's decision in 11hren);
David G. Savage, Early Retirees Can Lose Righs, Justics Rue LA. TNIMEs.June 11. 1996. at AI (de-
scribing IWien at end of story as one of Court's "other actions").
1-s See, e-g.,Joan Biskupic, Police May Use Traffic Stops For Drug Pom, Court S2)s; Offiers' *llotn'e
Doesn't Matter if Vwlation Occurs, Justices Rue 9-0, WASH. POST, June 11. 1996, at AI (addressing
drug courier profile without mentioning racial implications); Cops Cd Afore Room in Searchis;
High Court Expands Power to Stop Drivers, CHI. TRIB.,June 10. 1996. at 1 (ignoring the racial is-
sue).
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Wardlow ran when he observed police.7 7 The Court refused to adopt
a per se rule that any time a person ran at the sight of the police, this
constituted "reasonable suspicion" justifying a temporary stop.75  In-
stead, the majority ruled that in the context of all of the facts, most
notably the suspect's presence in a high crime/drug area, flight was
certainly a significant indicator of guilt and could, along with other
factors, support a finding of reasonable suspicion. In contrast to
the meager media coverage of Whren, stories on Wardlow appeared on
the front page of The New York Times.7 7 Numerous news organizations
not only featured the case, but gave prominent play to the fact that
African Americans and other minority citizens seemed much more
likely than whites to suffer the treatment that the case allowed.' For
example, The New York Times quoted an expert who stated that he was
struck by the Court's "obliviousness" to what minorities face out on
the street every day.
7 9
V. ASSESSMENT: A MIXED BAG
The U.S. Supreme Court decided Whren over four years ago. In
the grand scheme of constitutional and legal change, this is not a
long time. Perhaps it is premature to measure how state courts have
reacted to Wren. On the other hand, the idea of the new federalism
in criminal procedure is no longer new; the theory's advocates have
urged it upon courts and counsel for almost thirty years.' State
courts inclined to believe that their constitutions might differ from
Supreme Court interpretations of the federal Constitution and Bill of
'74 Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 119.
175 Id at 121-22.
176 ME
177 Linda Greenhouse, Right Can Justify Search By Police, High Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 13,
2000, at Al.
178 See Steve Lash, Decision Clears Way For Chases By Police; High Court Splits 5-4 in Stop-and-Frisk
Case, HousT. CHRON.,Jan. 13, 2000, at 1 (noting that minority advocates "assailed the ruling as
enabling police to harass minorities, particularly in high-crime neighborhoods"); Jackie Judd,
ABC World News Now: Supreme Court Gives Congress Power to Protect Privacy and Police Right to Pur-
sue Suspicious Bystanders (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 13, 2000) (stating that "minority and
civil liberties group say the ruling ignores what life is like in violent neighborhoods");Jan Craw-
ford Greenburg, Top Court: Cops Can Chase Those Who Flee, CHI. TRIB.,Jan. 13, 2000, at I (quot-
ing experts who said that the burden of the ruling "would fall unfairly on minorities, who, they
said, may have good reason to flee police because of legitimate concerns about harassment or
brutality."). While some of this coverage was no doubt the result of Justice Stevens' dissent,
which discussed the possible racial implications of the decision, news organizations often ignore
dissenting opinions. The fact that they did not ignore this one likely has less to do with the dis-
sent than its subject.
19 Greenhouse, supra note 177, at Al (quoting an expert who called the case a "troubling
indication of the court's obliviousness to what's really going on in the country" that did not ac-
knowledge the "growing evidence of police practices of 'racial profiling' and the singling out of
black people and members of other minority groups.").
ISO See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
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Rights began acting on this idea long ago;'" it no longer breaks any
new ground. Given this reality, it seems fair to attempt to assess re-
sponses to Whren.
Looked at fairly, state court reactions to Wihtren present a decidedly
mixed bag of results. Several states have rejected 117ren based on
their state constitutions, or could dependably be predicted to do so.
The Supreme Court of Washington, a leader in state constitutional-
ism under.justice Robert Utter, has broken ith the Supreme Court
over Whren'82 So far, it remains the only state supreme court to do
this. Lower courts in New York have rejected lliren; the analysis in
Dickson makes a reasonably good case that the New York Court of Ap-
peals would agree, based on its prior cases on pretext stops."" In New
Jersey, no state court has yet faced the question whether Mizren
should stand under the state constitution. But the state's unique and
strong protection against racial discrimination, under which courts
may suppress evidence in criminal cases when police enforce the law
in a racially biased way, makes it likely that New Jersey courts would
disapprove of the pretext stops Whren authorizes when the evidence
shows racially disproportionate enforcement."" In fact, the judge in
the Soto case, in which defendants charged racial profiling, used the
state law in exactly this way and suppressed the evidence.""
All of the these decisions explicitly show concern with racial bias
in law enforcement, very clearly in the NewJersey cases but still forth-
rightly in the others. Thus, a central theme of the Warren court's
criminal procedure cases finds a clear reflection in this case law; one
would have to imagine that these are exactly the types of decisions
that would satisfy Justice Brennan, one of the new federalism's earli-
est advocates.
But even though this handful of cases shows that states may reject
Wren, an almost equal number point in the opposite direction."
These cases evidence no desire by States to venture beyond what the
U.S. Supreme Court has commanded, and have indicate an uncritical
adoption of the Court's reasoning. Just as many courts at the inter-
mediate appellate level have deferred an), decision to their state su-
preme courts on whether state constitutional provisions allow pretext
stops. Perhaps most telling, the greatest number of cases that have
rejected Whren have done so not on the basis of state constitutional
law, but in far more conventional ways that have nothing to do with
the new federalism; for example, ruling that stops have continued be-
yond the time necessary for their ostensible, traffic-related reasons.
181 See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
18 See supra notes 55-62 and accompan)ing teXt.
8 See supra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
18 See supra notes 72-90 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
187 See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
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All in all, one would have to guess that Justice Brennan would find
the post-Wren state court cases a mixed result: A few states have fol-
lowed his lead or seem likely to do so, about as many have rejected
this approach, and others have used more traditional approaches.
The people of Washington, New York, and New Jersey have the right
to be free from pretext searches, and Brennan would no doubt ap-
prove, but citizens of other states have exactly the level of Fourth
Amendment protection from these stops described in VWren-that is,
none.Iss It is difficult to conclude that Brennan would find this a
ringing triumph.
But the whole picture is both more complex and more nuanced
than that. It would be a mistake to simply count up cases on both
sides of the issue and call this battle both a draw and a minor skir-
mish. When we broaden our vision of the issue of pretextual stops,
we see that more has happened by way of reaction to Whren than just
the cases discussed here. The constitutional process has many actors;
it has always had a multi-layered, dynamic quality that involved not
just courts, but the legislative and executive branches of the govern-
ment, too. Legislative response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions has
a long history in our nation;8 9 executive and administrative agencies
at every level of government have responded as well, time and time
again. These kinds of responses were not what Justice Brennan and
the other advocates of the new federalism had in mind. Supporters
of new federalism only said that American constitutionalism should
not be so narrowly focused on the nine Justices of the U.S. Supreme
Court and the U.S. Constitution. Put in context, these views seem
reasonable. These judges, lawyers, and academics were, after all, re-
acting to the fact that the Court had a (if not the) leading role in
many of the important legal and social changes since Brown v. Board
of Education.'9° In fact, on issues of racial justice, Supreme Court liti-
gation has been the chief, and arguably the most successful, instru-
ment of change in so many areas of the law, not the least criminal
procedure. Finding this door closing, proponents of new federalism
sought to preserve their gains in the way most analogous to what they
knew-the protection of rights with constitutional provisions, albeit
those provisions of the states. Perhaps post-Wren events illustrate
that we need to redefine the new federalism in a wider, more expan-
sive and traditional way; in essence, to adopt an approach that views
the responses of nonjudicial institutions as an important part of the
discussion.
188 While the Court in Whren left open the possibility of bringing a civil suit under the Equal
Protection Clause, this avenue of relief is fraught with many problems, both legal and practical.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
189 For a relatively recent example that was much discussed in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000), see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3501 (legis-
lating procedures for interrogation after Miranda v. Arizona).
190 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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To be sure, this vision is not as sweeping as the idea of a single
Supreme Court decision that answers an important legal question or
prescribes a unified national standard of police procedure in a par-
ticular situation. Nor is it as easy for lawyers and judges to under-
stand and use. Further, one can argue with much force that none of
the post-Whren developments surveyed here could have the same
strong or sweeping effect that a contrary decision in Whren would
have had. If the Supreme Court had simply decided that police
could only use traffic stops when a reasonable officer would have
made the stop-the position the defendants had advocated-courts
in all fifty states would have been obliged to force police to follow this
rule. No house to house fighting in state courts, state legislatures,
and other nonfederal institutions would have been necessary. It
would have been an altogether cleaner solution.
But reality intrudes here: Not only did the Court not decide the
case this way, but the decision went the other direction on a 9-0 vote,
without even a single cautioning concurring opinion recognizing the
potential dangers in the implications of the decision. In a world like
this, it is probably not too far-fetched to think that advocates for the
criminally accused would have been driven to the new federalism and
state constitutional law, even if the way had not been pointed out to
them.
Perhaps more importantly, the lessons of the post-I Vhren world are
especially vital for advocates of racial justice in the criminal process.
It is clearly no longer enough to think of this struggle as something
that can be won in the U.S. Supreme Court or other federal courts.
It must be reconceptualized as a multi-front wvar, something nonlaw-
yer advocates have long known!" To be sure, this piecemeal multi-
front approach has many drawbacks. It leads to a patchwork of legal
rights, not a national standard, and the battles involved in this ap-
proach are often political in the rawest sense. Further, it has to some
great degree been forced upon those seeking protection for the
rights of the criminally accused by the reality that neither the U.S.
Supreme Court nor the lower federal courts are receptive to their ar-
guments. Nevertheless, the multi-front approach has man) benefits.
Had the Supreme Court decided I11ren the opposite way, it is far
from clear that the national dialogue on racial profiling would have
blossomed as it has, with even the President and the Attorney Gen-
eral joining in.'" This conversation has spread to other issues where
race and criminal justice intersect, and has become an issue in state
politics as well because of pending legislation and investigations.'
191 See Steve Bachmann, Lauyers, Lau, and Sorial Change, 13 N.Y.U. RE . L & SoV. 0t LVGE 1,
20 (1984) (noting the importance of social and political factors. in addition to litigation, during
the labor movement and the civil rights movement).
192 See supra note 169-70 and accompan)ing text.
"' See supra notes 117-51 and accompan)ing text.
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Actions by police departments responding to the idea that pretext
stops have a disproportionate racial impact show that law enforce-
ment agencies and organizations nationwide have begun to consider
the impact of their practices on minorities in ways they may not have
before. 194 The result has been a re-invigoration of the struggle against
police abuse on the state and local level, where it can have an impact
on people and their everyday lives in a way that acts of Congress or
decisions of the Supreme Court generally do not.
An example will illustrate the far reaching effect of the post- Whren
debates. About two years ago, John Timoney, a former top adminis-
trator with the New York Police Department, became the Commis-
sioner of the Philadelphia Police Department. 19 In his brief time in
the job, Timoney has made many changes. He has brought modem
statistical and analytical methods to Philadelphia's police for the first
time, and some even credit him with bringing down the city's homi-
cide rate, something that had not happened even as other large cities
saw killings drop dramatically. 16 Perhaps less noticed has been Ti-
money's action, and forthright stand, on issues of race and policing,
especially the use of pretext stops in a racially disproportionate fash-
ion. Timoney has testified in the Pennsylvania legislature that police
"would have to be brain dead" not to see, and react to, the fact that
issues of race and policing must be confronted directly and forth-
rightly.197 And he has taken steps to begin the process. For years,
Philadelphia police earned credit with their superiors based, simply,
on how many drivers they stopped, regardless of the outcome of the
stop.95  This led to predictable abuses and community frustration
with traffic stops; police officers had an incentive to make stops, and,
not surprisingly, made as many as possible, regardless of their effect
on law-abiding members of the community. Timoney has now
changed these rules. Now, officers get credit not for the sheer num-
ber of stops they make, but for their quality.'9 Stops for the sake of
stops are no longer encouraged.2
194 See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
195 See Francis X. Clines, Philadelphia Police Chief Borrowsrom Bronx Beat: Blends Old Toughness
and New Technology, N.Y. TIES, Jan. 16, 2000, at 13 (noting that John Timoney was appointed
police commissioner of Philadelphia police in 1990).
1% Id
197 Traffic Stops and Racial Profiling. Hearing Before Subcomm. on Crimes and Corrections of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 182d Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999) (statement of John F. Ti-
money, Philadelphia Police Commissioner).
198 Id.
199 See id. ("I have ordered that the number of stops be eliminated as a basis for measuring an
officer's activity. Giving credit for stops misses the point that the stops must be lawful and en-
courages marginal stops or even the reporting of non-existent stops to pad an officer's activ-
it.. See Clines, supra note 195, at 16 (concerning former policy of credit for number of stops,
Commissioner Timoney says, "Can you believe that nonsense? [Under the new policy], [wle've
reduced our stops by 50 percent. You get credit when you lock them up.")
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Commissioner Timoney may have instituted this change regard-
less of the Supreme Court's decision in Wiren; but it is difficult to
imagine that he would have understood or known of the problem
without the nationwide discussion on racial profiling and the w%,'ay
race and policing intersect. Perhaps the pending legislation in Penn-
sylvania, which would require data collection 
on traffic stops,£"
helped prod him toward making this change in the incentives his of-
ficers have had to make stops. It is impossible to imagine Timoney's
"brain dead" comment in a climate uninfluenced by the racial justice
debate. The Commissioner has made it absolutely and publicly clear
that one of his goals is to deal with these issues himself so as to avoid
federal Department of Justice intervention that has taken place in
NewJersey. 2 And none of this-the New Jersey case, the Pennsylva-
nia legislation, changes in public awareness and attitudes, and the na-
tional discussion of pretext stops, which put the issue of race and
criminal justice on the agenda-would likely have taken place with-
out the Whren decision that slammed the door on Fourth Amend-
ment challenges to pretextual stops.
CONCLUSION
As the Burger and Rehnquist Courts began to dilute the effects of
the Warren Court's criminal cases, Justice Brennan and others called
for lawyers and judges to look to a new source for protection of the
rights of criminal defendants: state constitutions. This argument
sometimes proved controversial, but gained adherents nonetheless.
News that a state court has rejected a U.S. Supreme Court decision
on state constitutional law grounds no longer surprises us. The new
federalism lives; it is part of the legal landscape.
Using state court treatment of United States v. 117ren as a case study
of this theory, we can see that it offers a mixed bag of results at the
judicial level. But we can also see that we need to take a ider view of
the constitutional process. A distinct set of benefits has emerged
from Whren, separate and apart from the handful of state courts that
have forged their own paths on the issue of pretextual stops. We
need to refocus ourselves, away from courts and cases and to%-ard
multi-layered efforts on questions of racial justice. Mhen we do-or
rather, when we are forced to-we should see opportunity. Perhaps
we will not win the battle in one sweeping decision but wait for
democratic institutions to guide us to the beginnings of new solutions
to some of our most difficult problems.
-01 See supra note 126.
W2 See Clines, supra note 195 at 16. (stating that "right now, my selish ancillan goal Ls to keep
the feds out of Philadelphia.").
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